Supreme Court: Ames Takes Aim at “Background Circumstances” Reverse Discrimination Test
On June 5, at the end of October 2024 term, the Supreme Court held that majority group members do not need to meet a higher evidentiary standard to demonstrate unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The decision unanimously overturned the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” requirement and addressed a circuit split (a divergence in precedent between two separate federal courts of appeals).
The question before the Court in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services was whether a “majority group” member must have a heightened burden of proof to demonstrate that an employer discriminates against the majority. Petitioner Marlean Ames worked at the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004, where she was promoted from executive secretary to program administrator. In 2019, the petitioner, a heterosexual woman, applied for a new management position within the agency. The petitioner interviewed for the position but, ultimately, a lesbian woman was selected for a job. After the interview process, the petitioner was removed from her program administrator position, demoted, and took a pay cut. A gay man was hired to fill the petitioner’s former, and then-vacant position. The petitioner filed suit under Title VII, asserting that because of her sexual orientation, she was denied the management position and demoted.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency, citing the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green a burden shifting framework which uses circumstantial evidence to evaluate disparate treatment claims. That burden shifting framework places an initial burden on plaintiffs to show a few things that, if established, create an inference of discrimination, including establishing that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class. The Court noted that typically, this initial burden, called prima facie, is “not onerous.” The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. If the agency can articulate a legitimate reason, the burden shifts again and requires the employee to prove that the employer’s articulated justification for the employment decision was “pretext,” or an excuse for, discrimination. The district court relied on Sixth Circuit precedent and reasoned that the plaintiff failed to meet their prima facie burden under the Sixth Circuit’s precedent requiring members of “majority” groups (like heterosexual individuals) to demonstrate background circumstances to prove majority group discrimination. The district court held that the plaintiff, as a heterosexual person, and therefore, a majority group member, did not meet her evidentiary burden for the first part of the McDonnell Douglas framework because she could not show that there were “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reiterating that the plaintiff had to demonstrate these “background circumstances” in addition to the traditional prima facie showing. The Sixth Circuit provided examples of applicable circumstances, namely showing the minority group at issue made the employment decision, or demonstrating patterns of discrimination against the majority group. The Sixth Circuit’s decision emphasized the circuit split over whether majority and minority group plaintiffs are subject to different evidentiary standards when proving the first McDonnell Douglas step.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this circuit split, and ultimately did not find support in the statutory provisions of Title VII for requiring a heightened burden for members of majority groups. The Supreme Court cites to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to explain that the Title VII disparate treatment provision prevents employers “from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The Court reasoned that the disparate treatment provision does not distinguish between majority and minority plaintiffs, but makes it unlawful to discharge, refuse to hire individuals, or to otherwise discriminate against an individual through means such as compensation or employment privilege. The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s individual protections do not allow courts to obligate heightened requirements for majority group plaintiffs.
For those reasons, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for proper prima facie standard application.
Read the full case: Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services.